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Iraola: The Doctrine of Specialty and Federal Criminal Prosecutions

THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY AND
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Roberto Iraola*
Under the doctrine of specialty, recognized by the Supreme Court
over a century ago in United States v. Rauscher,1 an extradited fugitive is
subject to prosecution only for those offenses for which he or she was
surrendered.2 This doctrine or rule “fundamentally bears on treaty
obligations between states; the principle operates to ensure that the
receiving state does not abuse the extradition processes of the extraditing
state.”3
As federal case law on the application of the doctrine of specialty has
evolved, the limitation it imposes has been routinely incorporated in
extradition treaties4 and recognized by statute,5 and has been tested
Roberto Iraola, J.D. 1983, Catholic University Law School, Trial Attorney, U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Justice
or the United States.
1
119 U.S. 407 (1886).
2
Id. In Rauscher, Great Britain surrendered a fugitive to the United States so that he
could be prosecuted for murder. Id. Rather than try him for murder, however, the United
States prosecuted him for assaulting and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the
victim, a lesser included offense of murder which was not listed in the extradition treaty.
Id. at 432. In vacating the conviction, the Court in Rauscher held:
[A] person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court,
by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried
for one of the offenses described in that treaty, and for the offense with
which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a
reasonable time and opportunity have been given him, after his release
or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum
he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings.
Id. at 430. Applying the principle of comity, the Court ruled that the treaty contained an
implied specialty clause. Id. at 420. Thus, the decision has been interpreted to hold “that
when an extradition treaty is silent on the issue of specialty, the doctrine will be implied
into the treaty’s terms as long as the record indicates that the two countries that made the
treaty would follow the rules of comity in the absence of a treaty.” Timothy McMichael,
Note, Born to Run: The Supreme Court of Washington’s Misapplication of the Doctrine of
Specialty in State v. Pang, 74 WASH. L. REV. 191, 198 (1999).
3
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988); see United States v. Andonian,
29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The doctrine is based on principles of international
comity: to protect its own citizens in prosecutions abroad, the United States guarantees
that it will honor limitations placed on prosecutions in the United States.”).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Knowles, 2007 WL 1246026, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“The
extradition treaty between the United States and the Bahamas incorporates the doctrine.”).
See generally Speedy Rice & Renee Luke, U.S. Courts, The Death Penalty, and the Doctrine of
Specialty: Enforcement in the Heart of Darkness, 2 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2002)
(“[Rauscher’s holding] is typically integrated into extradition treaties.”).
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (2000) (“The Secretary of State may order the person
committed . . . to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be
*
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when evidence is introduced at trial or a jury instruction is given relating
to an offense or offenses for which extradition6 was denied or not sought,
and also, when evidence of such offenses is considered by the court at
sentencing.7 Additionally, questions concerning the application of this
doctrine have arisen when, in turning over a fugitive, the requested
country has made reference in its surrender decree to the limitation on
the maximum sentence which may be imposed.
This Article, which is divided into three parts, examines the
developing federal case law with respect to these questions.8 First, this
Article considers whether a fugitive has the right under an extradition
treaty to assert a violation of the rule of specialty, or whether this is a
right reserved to the rendering country. Next, the Article examines how
courts have addressed challenges to the government’s mode of proof and
theory of criminal liability when these affect offenses for which
extradition was either denied or not sought. Finally, this Article
discusses the consideration of criminal offenses at sentencing outside
those for which extradition was granted, and also addresses attempts by
the state that surrenders the fugitive to limit the maximum sentence
which may be imposed on such fugitive if ultimately convicted of the
offense(s) for which extradition was granted.
I. STANDING TO RAISE RULE OF SPECIALTY
It is not uncommon for a defendant who has been extradited to the
United States to attempt to have the charge(s) against him dismissed, or
to otherwise limit the scope of the government’s evidence at trial, by
invoking the rule of specialty. The first question presented when
considering such a challenge revolves around the defendant’s standing
tried for the offense of which charged.”). See also Benitez v. Garcia, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1234,
1246 (S.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 459 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Following Rauscher, many
treaties . . . were drafted to specifically incorporate the specialty doctrine. The United
States also adopted the doctrine in 18 U.S.C. § 3186 . . . . ”); Rice & Luke, supra note 4, at
1065 (“The doctrine is now implicitly recognized by federal statute.”).
6
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902). Extradition involves “the surrender by one
nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own
territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try
and to punish him, demands the surrender.” Id. at 289.
7
United States v. Ditommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1987). Courts “have narrowly
construed the doctrine of specialty by limiting Rauscher’s holding to cases involving a
formal extradition pursuant to [a] treaty.” Id.; see United States v. Trujillo, 871 F. Supp.
215, 219 (D. Del. 1994) (“It seems clear to the Court that the Doctrine of Specialty applies to
extradited individuals. In this case, [defendant] was not extradited.”).
8
See United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Unless
otherwise directed by treaty or statute, [courts] will look to United States precedent to
understand and apply the specialty doctrine.”).
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to raise this claim, an issue about which the courts are not in agreement.9
The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that a defendant has an
unqualified right to raise a specialty claim.10 The Second,11 Third,12 and
Seventh13 Circuits, on the other hand, have held that only the parties to
the extradition treaty may raise such a claim.14 The Eighth,15 Ninth,16
9
See Rice & Luke, supra note 4, at 1081 (“Standing decisions fall into three categories:
(1) cases holding that an extradited defendant has unlimited standing to raise a violation of
the doctrine of specialty claim; (2) cases holding that an extradited defendant has limited
standing; and (3) cases holding that an extradited defendant has no standing
whatsoever.”); Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making
Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 137–40 (1993) (discussing conflict).
10
See United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) (relying on Rauscher for
the proposition that defendant had “standing to raise [a doctrine of specialty challenge]”).
See generally John J. Barrett III, Note, The Doctrine of Specialty: A Traditional Approach to the
Issue of Standing, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 299, 302 (1997) (“In the Tenth [C]ircuit,
individuals have the right to assert violations of specialty regardless [of] whether the
requested sovereign can raise a violation of the doctrine.”).
11
See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) (“As a matter of
international law, the principle of specialty has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum
state, designed to protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right accruing to the
accused.”); United States v. Nosov, 153 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Decisions
from the Second Circuit—the binding authority for this court—suggest that a defendant
would not have standing to invoke the rule of specialty.”). But see United States v. Cuevas,
496 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (“This Court has not conclusively decided whether a
defendant has standing to challenge his sentence on the ground that it violates the terms of
the treaty or decree authorizing his extradition.”); Antwi v. United States, 349 F.Supp. 2d
663, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Second Circuit has not decided whether defendants have
standing to raise claims based on alleged violations of extradition treaty provisions relating
to the principles of specialty and dual criminality.”) (footnote omitted). See also United
States v. Martonak, 187 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that defendant had
standing to raise specialty claim to the extent that the surrendering country did not
contend otherwise).
12
See United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Had
[petitioner] brought suit invoking the [extradition] treaty or the Rule of Specialty, she
would lack standing.”).
13
See United States v. Munoz-Solarte, 28 F.3d 1217, 1994 WL 375334 at *2 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“Even if their extraditions violated the doctrines of specialty . . . [defendants] lack standing
to object to these violations.”); United States v. Burke, 425 F. 3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“[Extradition treaties] create rules for the relations between nations.”). See also MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It is well established that
individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence
of a protest by the sovereigns involved.”).
14
See Kenneth E. Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and
Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (1992) (“Courts which deny
defendants standing reason that because the principle of specialty exists to protect only the
surrendering state, only the surrendering state may insist on strict adherence to
specialty.”).
15
See United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The government’s
argument that [defendant] lacked standing to complain of a violation of the treaty is
without merit.”).
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and Eleventh17 Circuits have taken a middle ground and held that a
defendant may raise the issue if the sending state would have standing
to raise the claim as well.18 Finally, the First,19 Fourth,20 Fifth,21 Sixth,22
and District of Columbia Circuits23 have recognized the split but have
not expressed an opinion. As a practical matter, even in circuits that
have rejected the argument that a defendant has standing to raise a rule
of specialty challenge, or that have not expressed an opinion, courts
16
See United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (“An extradited
person may raise whatever objections the extraditing country is entitled to raise.”).
17
See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We hold that a
criminal defendant has standing to allege a violation of the principle of specialty. We limit,
however, the defendant’s challenges under the principle of specialty to only those
objections that the rendering country might have brought.”).
18
The district court in United States v. Bowe, 841 F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (S.D. Fla. 1993), aff’d
229 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000), explained the test this way:
[A]lthough a defendant has standing to assert those objections which
could be asserted by the extraditing state, he is merely serving as a
surrogate for the state, and an objection by the extraditing state itself
would clearly be owed greater deference in the determination of
whether that state considered the rule to have been violated.
Id. at 1165; see Eric P. Wempen, Note, United States v. Puentes: Re-Examining Extradition
Law and the Specialty Doctrine, 1 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 151, 167 (1995) (“[T]his approach
assumes that the surrendering nation’s silence amounts to an objection which is expressed
by the defendant.”). See also Rice & Luke, supra note 4, at 1082 (“Although this position
expressly limits the rights of the extradited defendants, these courts justify such a
limitation because it preserves the contractual, and hence diplomatic, relationship between
the two countries.”).
19
See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767, n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) (“We need not probe
the matter of standing . . . .”).
20
See United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992) (“This court has not yet
addressed the issue and, on the facts of this case, we decline to do so.”).
21
See United States v. Angleton, 2006 WL 2828657, at *4 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006) (“It is still an
open question in this circuit whether a criminal defendant has standing to assert the rule of
specialty.”); United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Whether
[defendant] has standing to raise the doctrine of specialty is an undecided issue in this
circuit.”); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 200 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (while considering a
challenge under the rule of specialty, the court questioned whether defendant had standing
to raise the issue since Spain had not objected). But see United States v. Quirox, 2005 WL
1427692, at * 3 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005) (“This Court’s decision in U.S. v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242,
243 (5th Cir. 1989), precludes a criminal defendant from arguing the Specialty Doctrine
when the asylum state[] . . . has failed to raise an objection to the proceeding.”).
22
See United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 578 n.10 (6th Cir. 2004) (“This
circuit has not expressly decided whether an extradited individual has standing to seek the
enforcement of th[e] [specialty] rule.”). See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584
(6th Cir. 1985) (Recognizing that “[t]he right to insist on [the] application of the principle of
specialty belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is
requested[,]” but addressing merits of claim), vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir.
1993).
23
See United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging
conflict but declining to take a position because defendant’s arguments lacked merit).
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often will review such claims.24 Therefore, we now turn to a discussion
of rule of specialty challenges in the context of the scope of proof at trial,
the government’s theory of liability, and sentencing.
II. SPECIALTY AND THE SCOPE OF PROOF AT TRIAL
The rule of specialty does not affect the scope of proof at trial with
respect to the charges for which a requested state grants extradition,25
nor the giving of jury instructions on theories of criminal liability related
to offenses for which extradition was granted or denied.26 Cases
addressing these issues are discussed below.
A. Evidence of Offenses for Which Extradition Was Denied as Predicate Acts
or to Prove Participation in a Charged Conspiracy
In United States v. Saccoccia,27 the defendant was extradited from
Switzerland on an indictment charging him with participating in a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
conspiracy, failing to file currency transaction reports (“CTRs”), illegally
structuring monetary transactions in order to avoid transaction reporting
requirements, using property derived from unlawful activities while
engaging in transactions affecting interstate commerce, money
laundering, and Travel Act violations.28 The Swiss authorities granted
the extradition request on all charges, except for sixty-seven counts
which pertained to the failure to file CTRs and the illegal structuring of
monetary transactions in order to avoid currency transaction reporting
24
See, e.g., LeBaron, 156 F.3d at 627 (“We need not decide this issue because, even
assuming arguendo that [defendant] has standing to challenge jurisdiction, we find that
prosecution on the four counts did not violate the doctrine.”); United States v. Nosov, 153
F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The court, however, need not consider th[e] issue [of
standing] in great detail, because even if [defendant] had standing, his argument would
fail.”). But see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (“Standing to
sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.”).
25
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th Cir. 1989) (“When
a grand jury indicts a defendant, and the defendant is tried for the precise offense
contained in the extradition order, the doctrine of specialty does not purport to regulate the
scope of proof admissible in the judicial forum of the requisitioning state.”). See also United
States v. Munoz-Solarte, 28 F.3d 1217, 1994 WL 375334, at *2 (7th Cir. 1994). If the
defendant was arrested under a provisional arrest warrant, the doctrine of specialty does
not require that the charges underlying such request be identical to those for which the
defendant is later tried. Id.
26
See, e.g., Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th
Cir. 1987).
27
58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1995).
28
Id. at 764–65.
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requirements.29 After his surrender, a superseding indictment was
returned against the defendant for charges which closely paralleled
those in the original indictment.30 The United States provided the
superseding indictment to the Swiss authorities and they agreed that the
defendant’s extradition had been granted with respect to the facts
charging him with participating in a RICO conspiracy.31
On appeal, following his convictions under the RICO and Travel Act
counts, the defendant argued that these convictions could not stand
because, in violation of the rule of specialty, the CTR offenses for which
he had not been extradited had served as predicate acts for these
offenses.32 Rejecting this contention, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit began its analysis noting that, as a general
proposition, it was difficult to envision “a violation of the principle of
specialty where the requesting nation prosecute[d] the returned fugitive
for the exact crimes on which the surrendering nation granted
extradition.”33 In this case, the court observed, the Swiss authorities had
“twice approved [defendant]’s extradition on counts that prominently
featured CTR offenses as predicates.”34 Furthermore, the indictment
under which the defendant ultimately was tried removed all references
to CTR offenses, and the jury was instructed that it should not consider
whether the defendant had committed any CTR offenses.35
The rule of specialty also has been interpreted not to foreclose the
admission of evidence relating to offenses for which extradition was
Id. at 765.
Id. at 765 n.5.
31
Id. at 765.
32
Id. at 767–68.
33
Id. at 768.
34
Id. The court in Saccoccia reasoned:
This approval—to which we must pay the substantial deference that is
due to a surrendering court’s resolution of questions pertaining to
extraditability[]—strongly suggests that the RICO and Travel Act
counts, despite their mention of predicates which, standing alone,
would not support extradition, are compatible with the criminal laws
of both jurisdictions. Though a Swiss official may informally have
fretted about the prospect of a RICO or Travel Act conviction based on
nonextraditable predicates, we are reluctant to conclude on this
gossamer showing that the [Swiss Federal Tribunal] did not know and
appreciate the clearly expressed contents of the indictment when it
sanctioned extradition.
Id. (citation omitted).
35
Id.; accord United States v. Moss, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147–48 (W.D. Tenn. 2004)
(denying the defense’s motion to dismiss counts in the indictment charging RICO
substantive and conspiracy charges, as well as forfeiture, because they were based on
money laundering charges for which Costa Rican authorities had denied extradition,
reasoning that under Saccoccia, these offenses could be used as predicate acts).
29
30
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denied when the defendant had been extradited on a narcotics
conspiracy charge. In United States v. Bowe,36 for example, the defendant
was extradited from the Bahamas on one count of a thirteen-count
indictment charging him with participating in a narcotics conspiracy.37
Prior to the start of the trial, the district court dismissed the twelve
counts for which the Bahamas had not granted extradition, and the
defendant was convicted of the conspiracy count.38
On appeal, the defendant argued that his conviction should be
reversed because, in violation of the rule of specialty, the government
had introduced evidence relating to the counts for which extradition had
been denied to prove the conspiracy charge.39 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded. The court first
noted that the rule of specialty “d[id] not affect the scope of proof
admissible at trial for the charges for which extradition was granted,”
nor did it “alter the forum country’s evidentiary rules[.]”40 The court
then reasoned that since the defendant had been charged and convicted
of only the conspiracy count, “for which the Bahamian government
approved his extradition, the prosecution’s sweeping evidentiary case
[ha]d] not violate[d] the doctrine of specialty.”41
B. Evidence Not Presented in Support of Extradition Request for Conspiracy
Charge
United States v. Puentes illustrates the principle that courts will not
interpret the rule of specialty in a manner that restricts the government’s
proof at trial with respect to a charged conspiracy offense for which
extradition was granted when the scope of the evidence exceeds that
which was presented to the requested state.42 In Puentes, Uruguay
granted the defendant’s extradition under four counts of an indictment,
one of which charged the defendant with conspiracy to import cocaine
221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1187.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1191.
40
Id. (citations omitted).
41
Id. at 1192; accord United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1413–14 (11th Cir.
1989) (evidence of money laundering was admissible to prove drug conspiracy for which
extradition was granted); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (evidence
of defendant’s acts and statements of co-conspirators were admissible to prove conspiracy
charge for which defendant was extradited, even though they predated period fixed for
conspiracy in surrender decree); United States v. Knowles, 2007 WL 1246026, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (evidence of trafficking offenses which occurred during conspiracy, for which an
extradition request was denied, was not barred by rule of specialty to establish conspiracy
offense for which extradition was granted).
42
50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995).
36
37
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from 1982 to November 29, 1988.43 After the defendant’s surrender, the
grand jury returned a superseding indictment which increased the
period of the conspiracy count to three years, from November 29, 1988,
to December 13, 1991.44 Summarily rejecting the defendant’s contention
that his conviction had to be reversed because his prosecution, under the
revised conspiracy charge in the superseding indictment, had violated
the rule of specialty, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that extending the
duration of the conspiracy merely broadened the scope of proof that the
government could submit in support of the charge for which the
defendant’s extradition had been granted.45
Similarly, in United States v. Abello-Silva,46 the defendant was
extradited from Colombia on the basis of a two-count indictment
charging him with conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana and
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute these drugs.47 After the
defendant was extradited to the United States, the grand jury returned a
superseding indictment which charged the defendant with the identical
offenses for which he had been extradited, but added more facts
depicting his illegal activities.48 The defendant was convicted of both
counts and challenged his conviction on appeal, alleging in part that his
trial under the superseding indictment had violated the rule of
specialty.49 In rejecting the defendant’s contention, the Tenth Circuit
noted that the doctrine of specialty is aimed at “parallel offenses and not
parallel facts.”50
Furthermore, the court observed, the doctrine
“specifically recognizes the possibility, for strategic reasons, that the
evidence introduced at trial was withheld from the extradition request[]”
because “[t]he specialty principle is not a vehicle for discovery.”51
In a similar vein, in United States v. Monsalve,52 the defendant was
extradited from Canada on the basis of a one-count indictment charging
him with conspiracy to export five kilograms or more of cocaine.53 The
evidence presented to the Canadian authorities in support of the request,
and upon which the Canadian authorities relied, consisted of a shipment
Id. at 1569.
Id. at 1569–70.
45
Id. at 1576 (“[W]e do not believe that the superseding indictment materially altered the
substance of the offense for which Puentes has been extradited. Count IV of the
superseding indictment merely . . . extended the conspiratorial period for three years.”).
46
948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991).
47
Id. at 1171.
48
Id. at 1172.
49
Id. at 1171–72.
50
Id. at 1174.
51
Id.
52
173 F.3d 847, 1999 WL 132238 (2d Cir. 1999).
53
Id. at *1.
43
44
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of approximately twenty-seven kilograms of cocaine.54 At trial and
subsequently at sentencing, however, the government presented
evidence linking the defendant to the exportation of approximately 113
kilograms of cocaine.55 On appeal, the defendant argued that his
conviction violated the rule of specialty because the evidence presented
to the Canadian authorities had been limited to the exportation of no
more than twenty-seven kilograms of cocaine.56 In rejecting this
contention, the Second Circuit ruled that the defendant had been
“convicted of exactly the same offense that was charged in the
indictment[, and] the fact that more evidence was presented at trial and
during sentencing than was presented to the Canadian authorities [wa]s
irrelevant.”57
Finally, in Antwi v. United States,58 the defendant was extradited from
Ghana on the basis of an indictment charging him with one count of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and
cocaine and counts of distribution and possession with intent to
distribute heroin.59 The defendant was convicted only of the conspiracy
count and, following the affirmance of his conviction on appeal, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that his detention was illegal
because the affidavit which had been submitted in support of his
extradition suggested that he was responsible for about $100,000 in
heroin sales but, in eliciting his conviction, the government had
presented more evidence at trial.60 The district court denied the petition
finding that the doctrine of specialty “d[id] not prohibit the requesting
state from proving in court that the defendant’s commission of the crime
for which he was extradited was more serious than evidence indicated at
the time of extradition.”61
C. Theory of Criminal Liability
Courts have consistently recognized the limitations inherent in the
application of the doctrine of specialty when it comes to the
government’s theory of criminal liability at the time the jury is charged.

Id.
Id.
56
Id. at *2.
57
Id.; cf. United States v. Archbold-NewBall, 554 F.2d 665, 684–85 (5th Cir. 1977) (rule of
specialty did not bar use in United States of evidence obtained in Martinique to prove
conspiracy offense for which defendants were charged and extradited).
58
349 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
59
Id. at 666.
60
Id. at 673.
61
Id.
54
55
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For example, in Gallo-Chamorro v. United States,62 the defendant was
extradited from Colombia under an indictment charging him with one
count of importation of cocaine, one count of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, and three counts of distribution of cocaine.63 The decree
granting the defendant’s extradition indicated that he could not be
prosecuted as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2.64 At the close of
the evidence, the government requested a Pinkerton instruction65 with
respect to the importation count.66 The defendant objected on the
grounds that he had been extradited as a principal and that the
instruction sought by the government represented “a ‘constructive
theory of liability’ to which Colombia would have objected.”67 The
district court rejected the defendant’s argument, ultimately giving a
Pinkerton instruction with respect to the importation count as well as
three distribution counts.68 The defendant was found guilty of the
importation and distribution counts, but was acquitted of the conspiracy
count.69 Following his sentence on these counts, the defendant appealed,
arguing that the district court’s decision to give a Pinkerton instruction
was reversible error because the theory of vicarious liability embodied in
that instruction was no different than that of 18 U.S.C. § 2, for which he
had not been extradited.70
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 was not
synonymous with co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton.71 The court
48 F.3d 502, 503 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id.
64
Id. Section 2 states:
(a)
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.
(b)
Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United
States, is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
65
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). This jury instruction is rooted in the
holding of Pinkerton, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a conspirator could be guilty
of a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator, even though he did nothing more
than join the conspiracy, if the offense was reasonably foreseeable and was committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 647–48.
66
Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d at 504 n.2. The importation count in the indictment indicated
that someone, other than the defendant, had actually transported the cocaine into the
United States. Id.
67
Id. at 504.
68
Id. at 504–05.
69
Id. at 505.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 506–07.
62
63
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reasoned that “Pinkerton liability, which requires the defendant’s
participation in a conspiracy, is much narrower in scope than aiding and
abetting.”72 Consequently, there was no violation of the rule of specialty,
and the district court had not erred in giving the Pinkerton instruction to
the jury.73
After the denial of his appeal, the defendant filed a habeas petition
requesting that his sentence be vacated, presenting a variant of the
argument that he had made on direct appeal regarding the district
court’s decision to give a Pinkerton instruction.74 Specifically, the
defendant argued in his petition that the Pinkerton instruction had
violated the specialty doctrine, not because it was analogous to the
vicarious liability found in 18 U.S.C. § 2, but because Colombia had
rejected his extradition on the count of the indictment charging him with
conspiracy to import cocaine.75 On appeal, following the denial of that
petition, the Eleventh Circuit again rejected his challenge, holding that
the Pinkerton instruction had not violated the rule of specialty because, in
this case, that instruction only enabled the government to “establish the
defendant’s membership in a conspiracy as an evidentiary fact to prove
guilt in the related substantive offenses.”76
In support of its ruling, the Eleventh Circuit relied on United States v.
Thirion.77 In Thirion, Monaco granted the request by the United States for
the defendant’s extradition on counts charging him with mail fraud, wire
fraud, and inducing interstate travel to defraud, but not a count charging
conspiracy to defraud the United States.78 While the defendant was not
tried on the conspiracy count, the district court instructed the jury on coconspirator liability under Pinkerton with respect to the substantive
counts for which he had been extradited.79 Rejecting the defendant’s
contention that his convictions could not stand because the doctrine of
specialty had foreclosed the giving of a Pinkerton instruction, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first determined that
“individual substantive counts need not make reference to coconspirator
72
Id. at 507. In support for this finding, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s
observation in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) that aiding and abetting
liability is broader in scope than under Pinkerton, because the former “makes a defendant a
principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether or not there is a
conspiracy . . . .” Id. at 507.
73
Id. at 506.
74
Gallo-Chamarro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).
75
Id. at 1306.
76
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987).
78
Id. at 150 & n.4.
79
Id. at 151. The substantive counts had charged that defendant was liable as an aider
and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Id.
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liability in order for the jury to be so instructed.”80 With this footing in
place, the court went on to rule that the doctrine of specialty did not
prohibit the government from seeking to establish a defendant’s
membership in a conspiracy as an “evidentiary fact to prove guilt” in
connection with the offenses for which he had been extradited.81
III. SENTENCING
In the federal system, “[a]s a general proposition, a sentencing judge
‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come.’”82 This wide discretion is reflected in the Federal
Rules of Evidence,83 the United States Code,84 and the United States

Id. at 152.
Id. at 153. See also United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2007) (“As
Pinkerton liability is an issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the
defendant of a substantive offense, whether the indictment charged a separate conspiracy
offense is simply irrelevant.”).
82
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). See generally Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (“[O]nce
the guilt of the accused has been properly established, the sentencing judge, in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed, is not restricted to evidence derived
from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court . . . .”).
The seminal case on sentencing is Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). In
Williams, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and the jury recommended
life imprisonment. Id. at 242. The judge imposed a death sentence based on information in
a probation report indicating that defendant had committed thirty burglaries in the vicinity
of the murder and that he also had been involved in activities indicating he “possessed ‘a
morbid sexuality[.]’” Id. at 244.
In rejecting defendant’s contention that the judge’s reliance on this information
violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment the Court initially
observed that historically, American and English judges at sentencing had been granted
“wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to . . . determin[e] the kind and
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” Id. at 246, 245-46. In this
vein, reliance by judges on presentence reports was merely an outgrowth of the “age-old
practice of seeking [sentencing] information from out-of-court sources to guide their
judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence.” Id. at 250–51. The Court noted
that to achieve the goals of reformation and rehabilitation and to insure that the
punishment fit the crime, “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s life and characteristics[,]” unfettered by the strict rules of evidence, was
necessary. Id. at 247. Finally, the Court reasoned that under the emerging practice of
individualized sentencing, a probation officer was not a defendant’s adversary and that
“most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent
imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in
open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.” Id. at 250.
83
See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing). See
generally United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1994) (“In the
sentencing phase of a case, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.”).
80
81
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Sentencing Guidelines.85
On a number of occasions, extradited
defendants have argued that the rule of specialty bars the court’s
consideration of evidence or other information relating to the charges for
which their extradition was not granted or sought. As demonstrated by
the discussion below, courts uniformly have rejected these arguments.
A. General Application of Sentencing Principles
In United States v. Lazarevich,86 the defendant was extradited from the
Netherlands on charges that he had made false statements on the
passport applications of his two children.87 The Dutch authorities denied
this aspect of the request seeking extradition based on charges of child
abduction because the defendant had already been tried and convicted
of similar charges by a court in Belgrade.88 The defendant ultimately
was convicted of making false statements in connection with the
passport application of one of his children, and he appealed his sentence
on the ground that the district court’s consideration of the abduction
charges in enhancing his sentence violated the rule of specialty.89
Relying on Witte v. United States,90 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
district court’s consideration of evidence relating to the defendant’s
abduction of his children to enhance his sentence within the statutory
84
See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court . . . may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.”).
85
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2007) (“In determining the
sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines
is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character[,] and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by
law.”); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”). In
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court ruled that the sentencing
guidelines, previously mandatory, are now advisory.
86
147 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998).
87
Id. at 1062.
88
Id. at 1063.
89
Id.
90
515 U.S. 389 (1995). In Witte, the district court determined defendant’s sentence, for
attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it by considering quantities of
cocaine that he had imported. Id. at 393–94. Subsequently, defendant was indicted for
conspiracy to import and attempt to import cocaine, and he contended that the indictment
on those charges “constitute[d] a second attempt to punish him criminally for the same
cocaine offenses[] . . . .” Id. at 397. The Supreme Court ruled that the “use of evidence of
related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence for a separate crime within the
authorized statutory limits d[id] not constitute punishment . . . .” Id. at 399.
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limits did not constitute “punishment” for purposes of the rule of
specialty.91 The court rejected the contention that merely because the
sentencing had taken place as a result of an extradition, it was removed
from the reach of Witte, reasoning that the negotiation of the treaty with
the Netherlands could not be divorced from its historical background
which “include[d] the long-standing practice of United States courts . . .
considering relevant, uncharged evidence at sentencing.”92
A similar result was reached by the court in United States v. Garcia.93
In Garcia, following his extradition from Canada, the defendant pled
guilty to a three-count indictment charging him with conspiracy to
distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute, and using a firearm in connection with the conspiracy.94 At
the time of sentencing, the district court considered marijuana shipments
in which the defendant engaged in addition to those to which he had
pled, and also his complicity in the murder of one of his distributors.95
Rejecting the defendant’s challenge that consideration of the evidence at
sentencing violated the doctrine of specialty, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the defendant had not been punished for offenses for which he had
not been extradited because under the law of the United States, “the
consideration of other conduct in the sentencing process is legally and
conceptually a part of the punishment for the inducted crimes and
within the limits set for those crimes.”96
In a similar vein, in United States v. Garrido-Santana,97 following his
conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, the defendant
appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it
applied an enhancement under the sentencing guidelines for obstruction
Lazarevich, 147 F.3d at 1063–64.
Id. at 1064; accord United States v. Fischer, 2007 WL 927948, at *3 (D. Or. 2007)
(“Petitioner argues that the doctrine of specialty was violated because his criminal history
was considered in his sentencing, meaning (in petitioner’s view) that he was punished for
conduct not specified in the extradition agreement. This argument is rejected.”).
93
208 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001).
94
Id. at 1260.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1261. The court observed:
With respect to the doctrine of specialty and U.S. law governing
sentencing[,] the doctrine of specialty does not restrict the scope of
proof of other crimes that may be considered in the sentencing process.
The distinction is thus drawn between proof of other crimes as a
matter germane to the determination of punishment for the extradited
crime and proof of other crimes in order to exact punishment for those
other crimes. Only the latter course is forbidden by the doctrine of
specialty.
Id.
97
360 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004).
91
92
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of justice.98 Specifically, the defendant argued that because he had been
extradited from the Dominican Republic solely on the cocaine offense,
the district court’s consideration of the external evidence of his failure to
appear, which further enhanced his sentence, constituted punishment in
violation of the doctrine of specialty.99 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit assumed arguendo that the treaty could be
interpreted to contain an implicit promise not to punish, as opposed to
prosecute, the defendant for any offense for which he had not been
extradited.100 Adopting the reasoning of Witte and Lazaravich, the court
ruled that the “enhancement [of the] . . . defendant’s sentence on the
narcotics offense based upon [the] defendant’s failure to appear at his
arraignment did not constitute ‘punishment’ for that conduct so as to
violate any implicit proscription against such punishment in the
extradition treaty.”101
Most recently, in United States v. Angleton,102 the Fifth Circuit
confronted the issue of the application of the rule of specialty at
sentencing. In Angleton, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of
aiding and abetting the misuse of a passport and one count of conspiracy
to commit passport fraud.103 The Netherlands had surrendered the
defendant on these three passport charges, but had refused to grant
extradition on a murder for hire charge and for failure to appear in
connection with that charge.104 In calculating the appropriate sentence,
the district court considered the defendant’s failure to appear, and the
defendant appealed his conviction, arguing in part that the district
court’s consideration of such conduct had violated the provision of the
treaty incorporating the rule of specialty.105 Adopting the reasoning of
the courts in Lazarevich and Garrido-Santana, the Fifth Circuit rejected this
contention and ruled that the doctrine of specialty is not infringed by a
district court’s consideration of relevant conduct under the sentencing
guidelines associated with a non-extradited offense in assessing the
appropriate punishment for the offense(s) for which a fugitive was
surrendered.106
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
100
Id. at 578.
101
Id.; United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) (enhancement for
obstruction of justice did not violate the rule of specialty).
102
201 Fed Appx. 238, 2006 WL 2828657 (5th Cir. 2006).
103
Id. at 239.
104
Id. at 240.
105
Id. at 243.
106
Id. at 243–44. See generally United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 187 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992)
(stating in dicta that “the fact that the trial court potentially considered the defendant's
prior illegal accounting practices in imposing a sentence does not mean that [the
98
99
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B. Forfeiture
Challenges to the imposition of a forfeiture order on the grounds
that it violated the rule of specialty have not been well received by the
courts. In United States v. Saccoccia,107 discussed above, the defendant
argued that the forfeiture order, which had been entered pursuant to
both the money laundering and the RICO charges, violated the rule of
specialty because it was tantamount to a prosecution and conviction for
offenses for which the United States had not sought, nor been granted,
extradition.108 The First Circuit Court rejected this contention holding
that, for purposes of extradition law, forfeiture was simply “incremental
punishment” for proscribed conduct, which in the defendant’s case
involved his conviction for money laundering and the RICO offenses.109
IV. LIMITATION ON PUNISHMENT
On occasion, in response to an extradition request, foreign countries
have attempted to set a maximum term of imprisonment for the
extradited fugitive. Some courts have analyzed disputes surrounding
compliance with such a limitation as falling within the ambit of the
doctrine of specialty.110 The following cases illustrate this point.
In United States v. Cuevas,111 the defendant was extradited from the
Dominican Republic on narcotics and money laundering offenses.112
About two weeks after the defendant’s return, the United States received
a copy of the decree authorizing his extradition.113 The decree
mentioned that the defendant was covered by the provisions of the
Dominican Republic’s domestic law which subjected nationals who were
defendant] was punished for those offenses.”). In addition to Lazarevich and GarridoSantana, the court relied on Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989), where the Eighth
Circuit held that an increase in the parole release guideline range due to the consideration
of a non-extradited offense did not violate the doctrine of specialty. Leighnor, 884 F.2d at
390. See Ahmed v. Morton, 1996 WL 118543, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he doctrine of
specialty does not prohibit the government from introducing evidence at petitioner’s
parole revocation hearing beyond the scope of the charged offense that may otherwise be
found to be relevant and admissible by the Parole Commission.”).
107
58 F.3d 754 (1995).
108
Id. at 783.
109
Id. at 784; cf. United States v. Moss, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147–48 (W.D. Tenn. 2004)
(denying the defense’s motion to dismiss counts in the indictment charging RICO
substantive and conspiracy charges, as well as forfeiture, because they were based on
money laundering charges for which Costa Rican authorities had denied extradition,
reasoning that under Saccoccia, these offenses could be used as predicate acts).
110
See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007).
111
402 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
112
Id. at 505–06.
113
Id. at 506.
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extradited to a maximum penalty of thirty years’ imprisonment.114
Following his guilty plea for the offenses for which he was extradited,
the district court sentenced the defendant to 390 months’ imprisonment,
finding that the 30-year cap did not apply because the United States had
never agreed to this limitation as a condition of the extradition.115
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the ruling below.116 After recognizing that this case raised the
application of the rule of specialty in the sentencing context,117 the court
preliminarily noted that the extradition treaty between the United States
and the Dominican Republic did not contain any provision limiting
sentencing.118 The court then found that there was no support in the
record for the proposition that the United States had ever made any
substantive assurance to the Dominican Republic that, if extradited, the
defendant would not be sentenced to more than 30 years’
imprisonment.119
Pointing to the normal course of dealings in
extradition practice, the court observed that generally, when a foreign
nation seeks to impose a limitation on the sentence that a fugitive may
receive as a condition to the grant of the extradition request, the foreign
nation formally seeks assurances from the United States as to this
limitation through diplomatic channels, by way of a diplomatic note.120
This gives the United States the opportunity to consider this request and
if, after consideration of the matter, the United States elects to provide
such assurance, it conveys its position by way of a diplomatic note to the

Id.
Id. at 506–08.
116
United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007).
117
Id. The court observed:
Typically, the rule of specialty is invoked to circumscribe the specific
crimes for which a defendant may be tried following extradition.
However, the rule of specialty has application in the sentencing
context as well. As we held in United States v. Baez, since the cauldron
of circumstances in which extradition agreements are born implicate
the foreign relations of the United States, a district court, [i]n
sentencing a defendant extradited to this country in accordance with a
diplomatic agreement between the Executive branch and the
extraditing nation . . . delicately must balance its discretionary
sentencing decision with the principles of international comity in
which the rule of specialty sounds. In more concrete terms, this means
that a district court should temper [its] discretion in sentencing an
extradited defendant with deference to the substantive assurances
made by the United States to an extraditing nation.
Id. at 262 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 264.
114
115
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foreign nation.121 In Cuevas, the Dominican Republic never requested or
secured any assurance regarding a limitation on the defendant’s
sentence; therefore, there was no violation of the rule of specialty when
the district court imposed a sentence in excess of 30 years’
imprisonment.122
Even when the foreign country has clearly conditioned the surrender
of the fugitive on a sentencing cap, if it turns him over before obtaining an
assurance from the United States, no application, much less violation of
the rule of specialty, will be found if the sentence imposed exceeds the
limitation. For example, in Benitez v. Garcia,123 the defendant, a Mexican
citizen, was convicted of murder in California.124 The United States
requested the defendant’s extradition from Venezuela and advised the
authorities that if convicted of first-degree murder he “would receive a
sentence of incarceration of 25 years to life.”125 The United StatesVenezuela extradition treaty expressly provided that before granting an
extradition request, the extraditing country had the right to extract
assurances that “the death penalty or imprisonment for life w[ould] not
be inflicted[,]”126 and the Venezuelan Supreme Court subsequently
approved the defendant’s extradition with the proviso that if he was
ultimately convicted, a sentence of death, life imprisonment, or
“punishment depriving his freedom for more than thirty years[]” would
not be imposed.127 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thereafter advised the
United States that the defendant’s extradition had been approved on the
Id. As the district court aptly noted below, “[d]iplomatic custom demands such
formality for good reasons: requiring that conditions of extradition be clearly established
by diplomatic exchange avoids ambiguity, provides courts with clear evidence of intent,
and establishes unambiguous guidelines for countries engaged in negotiation.” United
States v. Cuevas, 402 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
122
Cuevas, 496 F.3d at 264. The request for defendant’s extradition was made pursuant to
a bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic, as
well as a multilateral treaty to which both nations were signatories. Id. at 259. The court
rejected defendant’s contention that under the multilateral treaty, the United States was
bound by the Dominican Republic’s domestic laws, reasoning that “[t]he onus [wa]s on the
requested State to determine, prior to surrendering the individual, whether extradition is
permitted under its own laws and treaty obligations.” Id. at 263; see also United States v.
Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2006) (while the Dominican Republic’s domestic law
provides a sentencing limitation when it extradites its own citizens, defendant was unable
to “point[] to any agreement or undertaking made by the United States to limit his sentence
or even to a communication from the Dominican Republic to the United States expressing
an expectation that the sentence would be so limited.”)
123
495 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2007).
124
Id. at 642.
125
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126
Id. (quoting Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 19–21, 1922, U.S.-Venez., Art. IV, 43 Stat. 1968,
T.S. No 675).
127
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121
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condition that he would “not be sentenced to [death or] . . . life in prison
or incarceration for more than thirty (30) years.”128 Shortly thereafter,
the defendant was extradited to the United States, where he was
convicted of murder and sentenced to an unspecified sentence of fifteen
years to life.129
On appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially
observed that Rauscher had addressed limitations on charged offenses
whereas, in this case, the extradition decree attempted “unilaterally to
limit [defendant]’s sentence.”130 In that regard, the court observed that
while Venezuela could have refused to surrender the defendant until the
United States had agreed to the sentencing limitation, it instead opted to
prematurely relinquish custody of him.131 Declining to find that the
district court’s refusal to extend the teaching of Rauscher to a unilaterally
imposed condition was an unreasonable application of the existing law,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.132
When a fugitive has been surrendered pursuant to an express
condition involving a limitation of his possible sentence to which the
United States has consented, courts (in the Second Circuit) have
analyzed the agreed upon limitation in ascertaining whether the
sentence imposed violated the rule of specialty. For example, in United
States v. Baez,133 the defendant was extradited from Colombia on four
counts of an indictment charging him with racketeering, racketeering

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 641–42.
130
Id. at 644.
131
Id.
132
Id.; cf. United States v. Lara, 67 Fed. Appx. 72, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2003) (summarily
rejecting contention that under specialty doctrine, defendant, who had been extradited
from Colombia, could only be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized for his crimes under Colombian law). See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309
(1907). The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the district court’s ruling was consistent with
the teaching of Browne. Id. In Browne, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud
and fled to Canada. Id. at 310–11. Because of the limitations in the treaty, the Canadian
authorities ultimately surrendered defendant for attempting to import certain goods
without paying full customs duties, an offense for which he had been charged but not tried.
Id. at 311–12. When he arrived in the United States, he was sent to prison to serve his
sentence for conspiracy. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court declined to uphold the
reinstatement of the conviction on the conspiracy charge finding that the treaty “limit[ed]
the imprisonment as well as the trial to the crime for which extradition had been
demanded and granted.” Id. at 318.
133
349 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2003).
128
129
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conspiracy, and murder in aid of racketeering.134 Following his
conviction, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.135
On appeal, the defendant argued that his sentence violated the rule
of specialty because it contravened the terms of a diplomatic note which
had been given by the United States to Colombia containing specific
assurances regarding the imposition of a life sentence.136 In particular,
after obtaining an assurance from the United States that the death
penalty would not be sought or imposed, Colombian authorities sought
a further assurance that the defendant would not be subject to a life
sentence.137 In response, the United States assured Colombia through a
diplomatic note that it would not seek such a sentence and that, if one
was imposed, “the United States executive authority w[ould] take
appropriate action to formally request that the court commute such
sentence to a term of years.”138 The defendant was then extradited.139
Concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion in
imposing a life sentence, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the
diplomatic note had not unqualifiedly assured the Colombian authorities
that a life sentence would not be imposed.140 To the contrary, the note
expressly contemplated this possibility, but assured the authorities that if
that occurred, the United States would seek to have the sentence reduced
to a term of years.141 In this case, the prosecutor did just that, but the
district court declined the request and sentenced the defendant to life.142
Id. at 91.
Id.
136
Id. at 92.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.; see United States v. Gonzalez, 275 F. Supp. 2d 483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (no violation
of the rule of specialty where diplomatic correspondence indicated that life sentence might
be imposed in which case Executive would request reduction of that sentence).
142
Baez, 349 F.3d at 92–93. While affirming the sentence, the Second Circuit was critical
of the district court’s apparent view that it was free to “ignore the consequences of an
extradition agreement between Colombia and the United States because the Judiciary is a
branch of our tripartite government independent of the Executive branch.” Id. at 93. The
court observed:
[C]ourts should temper their discretion in sentencing an extradited
defendant with deference to the substantive assurances made by the
United States to an extraditing nation. If anything, such deference may
well allow the United States to secure the future extradition of other
individuals because foreign nations would observe that the limitations
they negotiated with the Executive branch in respect to the prosecution
of their extradited citizens are being honored. This is not a surrender
of the independence of the Judiciary to the Executive branch. To the
134
135
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Another example involving agreed upon limitations regarding
sentencing is found in United States v. Campbell.143 There, the defendant
was convicted of numerous armed robbery and firearms charges
following his extradition from Costa Rica for these offenses.144 Prior to
his extradition, Costa Rican authorities sought an assurance from the
United States that the defendant’s sentence would not exceed fifty years,
and the United States responded that defendant would “not be
sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment greater than 50 years.”145 In
addition, the district court entered an order prior to the defendant’s
extradition indicating that should he ultimately be convicted, the court
would not “impose any sentence pursuant to which the defendant
would serve a term of imprisonment of greater than fifty years.”146
Following the jury’s verdict, the United States obtained clarification from
the Costa Rican authorities that the judgment of conviction could
provide a term of imprisonment greater than fifty years, so long as the
defendant’s release was guaranteed after he served no more than fifty
years.147 The district court thereafter sentenced the defendant to 155
years’ imprisonment, but ordered his release after he served fifty
years.148
On appeal, the defendant argued that his 155-year sentence had
violated the terms of the grant of his extradition because he had received
a sentence which exceeded fifty years.149 The Second Circuit rejected this
contention holding that the district court’s order, accompanying its
judgment, which made clear that the defendant was to serve no more
than fifty years of the 155-year sentence, fully complied with the terms of
the extradition grant.150

contrary, it is the classical deference courts afford to the political
branches in matters of foreign policy.
Id.
300 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1049 (2003).
Id. at 205.
145
Id. at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146
Id. at 206–07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147
Id.
148
Id. at 205.
149
Id. at 211.
150
Id. at 212. The court in Campbell discussed the doctrine of specialty in its opinion but
did not directly tie it to its ruling that the sentence imposed had not violated the terms of
the extradition grant. But see United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2007)
(court recognized that the “rule of specialty has application in the sentencing context as
well[]”). Id.
143
144
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V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of specialty firmly establishes “that the requesting state,
which secures the surrender of a person, can prosecute that person only
for the offense for which he was surrendered by the requested state or
else the requesting state must obtain the consent of the surrendering
state before proceeding on other charges.”151 When applying this rule,
federal courts have been careful to ensure that it is not “construed to
permit foreign intrusion into the evidentiary or procedural rules of the
requisitioning state, as distinguished from limiting the jurisdiction of
domestic courts to try or punish the fugitive for any crimes committed
before the extradition, except [for] the crimes for which he was
extradited.”152 Thus, the rule of specialty has neither been interpreted to
bar the admission of evidence relating to offenses for which extradition
was denied to establish predicate acts under RICO and Travel Act
counts, when extradition was granted for those offenses,153 nor does it
bar admission of evidence to establish participation in a narcotics
conspiracy.154 Courts also will not apply the rule of specialty to restrict
the scope of proof with respect to a conspiracy charge for which
extradition was granted when the evidence admitted at trial exceeds that
which was presented to the rendering state at the time the extradition
request was submitted,155 or to foreclose the government from obtaining
a Pinkerton instruction in connection with offenses for which the
defendant was extradited.156
In the sentencing context, and consistent with well-established
principles, federal courts continue to exercise wide discretion as to the
information considered in fashioning an appropriate sentence. In the
case of defendants who have been extradited, courts will consider

M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTICE
§ 6.1, at 511 (4th ed. 2002); see 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 477, 578 (1987).
152
United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
153
See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767–68 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Moss, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147–48 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).
154
See United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1191(11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d
939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Knowles, 2007 WL 1246026, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
155
See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Monsalve, 1999 WL
132238, at *1 (2d Cir. 1999); Antwi v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
156
See Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 506–07 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thirion, 813
F.2d 146, 152–53 (8th Cir. 1987).
151
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evidence relating to counts for which extradition was not granted157 or
sought.158 The point made by courts here is that even when analyzing
the application of the doctrine when punishment, as opposed to
prosecution, is involved, there is a difference to be “drawn between
proof of other crimes as a matter germane to the determination of
punishment for the extradited crime and proof of other crimes in order
to exact punishment for those other crimes. Only the latter course is
forbidden by the doctrine of specialty.”159 And, in defining punishment,
one circuit has held that an order or forfeiture simply represents
“incremental punishment” for proscribed conduct not triggering
application of the rule of specialty when such forfeiture was not
specifically sought in an extradition request.160
Finally, some courts have treated challenges by defendants to
limitations that sending states have requested the United States place on
the defendant’s sentence when granting extradition as falling within the
doctrine of specialty. The developing case law reveals that when that
limitation was not timely and formally communicated to the United
States, no violation of the rule of specialty will be found.161 Even when
the foreign country has clearly sought to condition the surrender of the
fugitive on a sentencing cap, however, if it turns him over before
obtaining an assurance from the United States, no application, much less
violation, of the rule of specialty will be found when the sentence
imposed exceeds the limitation.162 If the surrender takes place after an
express sentencing limitation to which the United States consented,
courts will analyze the agreed upon limitation in ascertaining whether
the sentence imposed violated the terms of the surrender.163

157
See United States v. Angleton, 201 Fed Appx. 238, 243–44 2006 WL 2828657, at *4 (5th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1998). See also
United States v. Fischer, 2007 WL 927948, at *3 (D. Or. 2007).
158
See United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 577–79 (6th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Garcia, 208 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1062
(2001).
159
Garcia, 208 F.3d at 1261.
160
See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 783–84 (1st Cir. 1995).
161
See United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2006).
162
See Benitez v. Garcia, 459 F.3d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Lara, 67 Fed.
Appx. 72, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2003).
163
See United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Campbell,
300 F.3d 202, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2002).
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